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This case arises from the creation of an application by Amazon named
"Amazon Appstore for Android."' The issue is whether Amazon can be held
liable for trademark infringement and dilution for developing the "Amazon
Appstore for Android" application by Android mobile devices.2 Apple
brought this action against Amazon alleging five causes of action including,
trademark infringement under the Lanham Act and common law, dilution
under the Lanham Act and common law, and unfair competition.3 Apple also
sought a preliminary injunction.4 Trademark infringement under the Lanham
Act provides that a "likelihood of confusion" standard must be met for in-
fringement of an unregistered trademark.5 Dilution under the Lanham Act
mandates that a plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief if he or she can estab-
lish that the mark is famous, competitors are making commercial use of the
mark after the mark became famous, and the mark is likely to cause dilution
by blurring or tarnishment. 6 The District Court for the Northern District of
California held that Apple failed to meet its burden for all the asserted claims
and that Amazon had made proper use of the term "App Store" by specifi-
cally designating, in its name, the market for which the application is in-
tended.7 This case presents an important, cautionary measure for companies
seeking to bring new but similarly functioning application products to the
online market.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Apple, Inc., is a 35-year old multinational corporation known
for its consumer electronics, computer software, and personal computers.8
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1. Apple, Inc. v. Amazon.com Inc., No. C 11-1327 PJH, 2011 WL 2638191, at *1
(N.D. Cal. July 6, 2011).
2. Id.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006); Apple, 2011 WL
2638191 at *1
4. Apple, 2011 WL 2638191 at *2.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
7. Apple, 2011 WL 2638191 at *8, 11, 12.
8. APPLE, INC., http://store.apple.com/us.
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Apple is the exclusive licensee of more than 140 trademarks.9 Since 2008,
Apple has provided an online store featuring applications that can be
downloaded to its various consumer electronic products such as the iPod,
iPad, and Mac.0 The downloadable applications from the "App Store" are
for exclusive use on Apple's consumer electronic products."]
Defendant, Amazon.corn Inc., is a 17-year old multinational electronic
commerce company that provides an online marketplace that enables third
parties to sell retail goods.' 2 Amazon, located at www.amazon.com, allows
both registered companies and registered individual sellers to post a used
item or product on the trademarked "Amazon Marketplace" for a price set by
the seller.13 The Amazon Marketplace connects sellers and buyers and is the
basis of its business model for this particular section of Amazon.com.'4
Once a successful sale is completed between the registered seller and buyer,
Amazon.com takes a small percentage of that transaction as its profit.'5
On July 17, 2008, Apple began the process of registering a trademark
for the term "App Store" by filing with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO").16 Nearly a year and a half later, on January 5, 2010, the PTO pub-
lished the mark in the Trademark Official Gazette, allowing any party to
contest the mark if it felt it would be damaged by it.17 That same month,
Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft") filed an opposition to the term's regis-
tration with the Trademark Trials and Appeals Board ("TTAB") asserting the
term "App Store" could not be registered because it was too generic.18
In September 2010, Amazon began searching for software developers to
assist in a future project which involved a mobile software download ser-
vice. 19 In January 2011, Apple received word of this new Amazon project
9. APPLE, INC., http://www.apple.com/legal/trademark/appletmlist.html.
10. APPLE, INC., http://store.apple.com/us.
11. APPLE, INC., http://www.apple.com/mac/app-store/.
12. AMAZON.COM INC., http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=176060&
p=irol-mediaKit.
13. AMAZON.COM INC., http://www.amazon.com/Careers-Homepage/b/ref=
amblink_5763692_1 ?ie=UTF8&node=23936401 I &pf rd_m=ATVPDKIKX0
DER&pf rd_s=left4&pfrd_r=- IEZPOS IDQS6GDVB5E8SN&pfrd_t= 101 &
pLrdp=1298548562&pLrdi=23936701 1.
14. AMAZON.COM INC., http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=176060&
p=irol-mediaKit.
15. Id.
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and demanded Amazon cease any use of the mark "App Store."20 Amazon,
however, made no substantive response to this demand.21 Subsequently, in
March 2011, Amazon launched the "Amazon Appstore for Android."22 This
service, available on Amazon.com, offers about 4,000 mobile software appli-
cations for download onto Android mobile devices.23
Ill. DESCRIPTION OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM
Apple filed this claim in the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of California against Amazon on April 6, 2011 asserting multiple
causes of action.24 Under both the common law and the Lanham Act, Plain-
tiffs sought a preliminary injunction enjoining Amazon from using the term
"App Store" in the name of Amazon's newly created Appstore service.25
Plaintiffs also allege, under the Lanham Act, Amazon is liable for dilution
because "its mark is famous . . . [and] widely recognized by the general
consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods
or services of the mark's owner."26 Lastly, Plaintiffs alleged unfair competi-
tion.27 The court analyzed the claims separately, first looking to trademark
infringement and then looking to the dilution claim.28
IV. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE HISTORY
On July 6, 2011, the District Judge in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California issued an order denying Apple's mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction.29 This followed the hearing that occurred
on June 22, 2011.30 Apple has taken no further action after the court denied
its preliminary injunction.
V. DISTRICT COURT HOLDING AND OVERVIEW OF RATIONALE
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California
held that Apple failed to meet its burden on the trademark infringement
claims, under the Lanham Act and common law, and on the dilution claims,
20. Id.




25. Id. at *2.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2006); Apple, 2011 WL 2638191, at *8.
27. Id. at *1.
28. Id. at *2, 8.
29. Id. at *1.
30. Id.
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under the Lanham Act and common law.3' Hence, Apple's motion for a
preliminary injunction was denied.32 The Court's decision focused on Ap-
ple's infringement and dilution claims.33 Despite Apple's unfair competition
claim, the Court specifically stated "[this is a trademark infringement
case."34
VI. COURT'S RATIONALE
The Court began its analysis by asserting that a plaintiff seeking a pre-
liminary injunction "must establish that it is likely to succeed on the merits,
that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,
that the balance of equities tips in its favor, and that the injunction is in the
public interest."35 Further, the Court stated that "an injunction is a matter of
equitable discretion and is an extraordinary remedy that may only be
awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief."36
Therefore, Apple had a high burden of proof. While Apple alleged violations
of trademark infringement and dilution under both state common law and
federal law (Lanham Act), the Court analyzed the infringement claim under a
test established by the Ninth Circuit and then analyzed the dilution claim
under the federal Lanham Act requirements.37
The Court first addresses Apple's trademark infringement claim. In re-
sponse to Apple's allegations of trademark infringement, Amazon contends
that Apple failed to demonstrate it is likely to succeed on the merits of the
claim because "the 'App Store' mark is generic (and therefore not protect-
able), and even if the mark is not generic, Apple cannot demonstrate any
likelihood of confusion."38 The Court applied a two-prong test requiring Ap-
ple to first "show ownership of a legally protectable mark" and second, to
demonstrate "a likelihood of confusion arising from Amazon's use."39 The
first prong classifies the mark in question "as either generic, descriptive, sug-
gestive, arbitrary, or fanciful."40 On this point, the Court assumed the mark
to be protectable as a descriptive mark that had acquired a secondary mean-
31. Apple, 2011 WL 2638191 at *7, 11.
32. Id. at *12.
33. Id. at *2, 8.
34. Id. at *1.
35. Id. at *2.
36. Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
37. Apple, 2011 WL 2638191 at *4, 8; Applied Info. Scis. Corp. v. eBay, Inc., 511
F.3d 966, 969 (9th Cir. 2007).
38. Apple, 2011 WL 2638191, at *5.
39. -Id. at *2.
40. Id.
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ing.41 The Court disagreed with Amazon's contention that the mark is purely
generic because the mark, "App Store," is not primarily understood to re-
present a specific group of services and Apple's principal competitors all had
used terms other than "App Store" to describe their similarly functioning
services.42 Despite the Court's disagreement with Amazon's contention that
the mark is purely generic, it did not find that Apple had shown the mark to
be suggestive because there was no need for a leap of imagination to under-
stand what the term meant. 43 Therefore, the Court found Apple failed to
satisfy the first prong of the trademark infringement test.M
The Court next addressed the second prong of the infringement test:
whether Apple can establish any likelihood of confusion with Amazon's use
of the mark "App Store."45 Courts employ the eight-factor Sleekcraft test to
assess whether a likelihood of confusion exists in trademark infringement
cases. 46 The Sleekcraft test looks at the following factors: (1) the strength of
the mark; (2) the proximity or relatedness of the goods; (3) the similarity of
the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) the marketing channels used;
(6) the degree of care customers are likely to exercise in purchasing the
goods; (7) the defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and (8) the likelihood
of expansion into other markets. 47 The Court found factors two and three
favored Apple to some degree because both companies are offering
downloads of software applications for mobile devices and the marks are
essentially identical in sight, sound, and meaning.48 However, the Court
found factors one, five, and seven favored Amazon because Apple did not
establish that "App Store" is a strong mark, the marketing channel to be used
is the Amazon.com website and not the Apple iTunes website, and Apple
failed to show Amazon's intent in selecting the mark.49 The Court found the
remaining three factors to be neutral, not clearly favoring either side.50 The
Court found Apple failed to establish the second prong of the trademark in-
fringement test.5' Consequently, the Court held that Apple's trademark in-
fringement claim must fail.52
41. Id. at *7.
42. Id. at *4, 7.
43. Id. at *7.
44. Apple, 2011 WL 2638191, at *7.
45. Id. at *4.
46. Id.
47. AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979).
48. Apple, 2011 WL 2638191 at *7-8.
49. Id.
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The Court then addressed Apple's dilution claim. The Court analyzed
the claim based on whether Apple's mark is famous, whether Amazon's
mark is similar enough to Apple's mark to blur the distinctiveness of Apple's
mark, and finally whether Amazon's use of the mark will tarnish Apple's
mark.53 The Court first looked to determine whether a mark is famous by
referring to the Lanham Act factors: "(1) the duration, extent, and geographic
reach of advertising and publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publi-
cized by the owner or third parties; (2) the amount, volume, and geographic
extent of sales of goods or services offered under the mark; (3) the extent of
actual recognition of the mark; and (4) whether the mark is registered."54
Considering these factors, the Court found that the "App Store" mark was not
famous enough to be "prominent" and "renowned."55 The Court, however,
did find that Apple had spent large amounts of advertising and publicity
money, sold several applications from its "App Store," and furnished evi-
dence supporting actual recognition of the "App Store" mark.56 Neverthe-
less, the Court noted that the term "App Store" had been "used by other
companies as a descriptive term for a place to obtain software applications
for mobile devices."57 Therefore, the Court determined that Apple had failed
to establish that its "App Store" mark was famous.58
Next, the Court briefly addressed Apple's claims for dilution by blurring
and by tarnishment under the Lanham Act and quickly disposed of them
both.59 First, because the majority of the factors relevant in determining blur-
ring were found to be in favor of Amazon, the dilution by blurring claim
failed.60 The Court decided that Apple did not meet its burden on this claim
for several reasons. The Court explained that the mark is more descriptive
than it is distinctive and that Apple's exclusive use of the mark faded as more
companies over the years began using the term. 61 Furthermore, the mark had
widespread recognition only as a descriptive term and Apple had not put
forth any concrete evidence demonstrating that Amazon actually intended to
create an association between its Android apps and Apple's apps.62 Subse-
quently, the Court held that Apple had failed to establish dilution by tarnish-
53. Id. at *8-9.
54. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2006); see also Apple, 2011 WL 2638191, at
*8.




59. Id. at *1 1-12.
60. Id. at *IL.
61. Apple, 2011 WL 2638191 at *11.
62. Id. at *11.
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ment because Amazon had not offered apps for Apple devices, and thus
Amazon's App Store was not damaging to Apple's reputation.63
VII. CRITIQUE OF COURT'S APPROACH
The Court's reasoning was quite methodological and focused on the rel-
ative strength of each side's arguments regarding all of the factors consid-
ered. Apple made strong arguments and provided intense evidence regarding
the second and third Sleekcraft factors considered in the 'likelihood of confu-
sion' prong of the infringement claim.64 Yet, the Court found Amazon's
counter arguments more persuasive because Amazon had demonstrated that
there was no need for intense evidence at the preliminary injunction stage. 65
The Court set the burden of proof quite high for each claim because that is
the standard required for an injunction. However, the application of this
holding to a factually similar case may not be as clear, should it go to trial.
Apple, Inc. v. Amazon.com Inc. impacts the state of the law in three
ways. First, products with similar functions, but inherently separate markets,
may not be subject to trademark infringement claims because the first prong
of the infringement test specifically requires consumer confusion. Given
that, Amazon's use of the phrase "for Android" in combination with the "in-
tended market" Sleekcraft factor under the consumer confusion prong proba-
bly should have discredited any sort of infringement claim brought by
Apple.66 Amazon's choice of name inherently makes it clear that Amazon's
only intended market is Android mobile devices, not Apple mobile devices.67
The Court, by favoring Amazon on this factor, may create situations where a
company considering the use of the word "App" in its mark for a new online
application store will include a mark or name that designates the specific
market to which the applications are intended to be sold as a way to avoid
liability. Accordingly, as long as a company uses the name of the market for
which a retail or distribution service is intended, a company can eliminate
any potential trademark infringement attack. '.... The court should have con-
sidered Amazon's inclusion of its intended market, "for Android," in its ap-
plication store's name in greater depth prior to the hearing on this claim. It is
possible that future cases with similar facts will cite this holding as a reason
to dismiss the claim.
Second, the Court wrestles with the fifth factor, the 'likelihood of confu-
sion' prong of the trademark infringement test, which analyzes the market
63. Id. at *12.
64. See id. at *4.
65. See id. at *6, 8.
66. See id. at *8.
67. Amazon points out that apps compatible with Apple devices are available for
purchase exclusively at Apple's App Store and not through any other resource.
See Apple, 2011 WL 2638191 at *6.
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channel used for each company's application.68 The Court wavered on this
factor and seriously considered how Apple may have been favored "if one
considers the marketing channel to be the Internet (where almost anything
today can be bought or sold)."69 Since the Court was less decisive here, it
leaves future courts with room for interpretation on what the standard for a
marketing channel should be.70 Possible interpretations include the com-
pany's own website, other online retailers, or even the internet in general. It
is difficult to tell how this case will be applied to future Ninth Circuit cases
when there is a similar trademark infringement claim but the mark in ques-
tion only partially designates its intended market.
Third, this case is representative of the use of trademark infringement
litigation as a "bullying" tactic by larger companies to stall a competing com-
pany from obtaining a similar trademark on a name. In this case, Apple had
filed the original complaint prior to Amazon's launch of its "Amazon App-
store for Android" product, demonstrating an example of this "bullying/stall-
ing" tactic.71 Did Apple file the claim because it actually felt Amazon's new
product name infringed upon its "App Store" mark or simply because Apple
knew it had the capital available to litigate a claim even though it did not
truly feel threatened? If the latter is true, what would keep other highly capi-
talized companies from adopting the same tactic? This type of litigation
could potentially have two negative results. First, smaller companies may be
deterred from developing new technologies because they may fear being
sued by larger companies who can afford to litigate claims for longer periods
of time. Second, court dockets could be clogged with "bullying" claims,
making the judiciary less efficient and delaying smaller companies from get-
ting their product to market due to trademark infringement litigation. Either
way, the winner seems to be the larger, more capitalized companies.
Is such a tactic ethical? Should there be legislation proposed to prevent
this type of behavior by companies with the capital to perform such tactics?
Perhaps most importantly, this Court's holding may represent the idea that
courts are looking to deter such "bullying" litigation tactics. While the Court
held for Amazon and denied the preliminary injunction, future courts may
not have such a high burden of proof, and future plaintiffs may be more
successful. A holding in opposition to this case may not further the Court's
goal of limiting the amount of trademark infringement cases filed by large
companies as a "bullying" tactic.
68. See id. at *8.
69. See id.
70. See Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d
1137, 1151 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining how the marketing channel factor is
vague and is not of much help in determining likelihood of confusion).
71. See Apple, 2011 WL 2638191, at *1.
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VIII. OVERVIEW OF CRITIQUE
Apple, Inc. v. Amazon.com Inc. addressed issues that are on the rise in
the world of e-commerce and, more specifically, newly created applications.
While the emergence of thousands of new applications creates a surplus of
new opportunities for companies, it also brings about the very real possibility
that more than one company will create an application with similar function-
ality. Inevitably, these applications will contain similar names. Thus, the
question arises-does a lack of technological terminology or names for the
functions of these applications contribute to trademark infringement claims?
This case illustrates that a limited number of different terms or names for
new technological products with similar uses in the online market may lead
to increased trademark infringement litigation, despite inherent differences in
the product's intended market.
This California District Court relied heavily on the factors established
by both statute and precedent for systematically analyzing each prong of
every claim and for finding that the burden of proof is quite high for both the
infringement test and the dilution test when a party seeks a preliminary in-
junction.72 In this case, although the Court admitted that Apple had made
strong arguments concerning several of the factors, it ultimately found that
Apple had failed to meet the high burden of proof for either the infringement
or the dilution claim, despite Amazon's very similar "App Store" mark.73
Therefore, should another company endeavor to create an online application
store and use some version of "App Store" as part of the name, it may not be
so clear as to whether that name will result in trademark infringement. This
may lead a company to search for a new term instead of "app" or "applica-
tion" in its name so as to avoid potential disputes. It will be interesting to see
whether future courts analyzing trademark infringement claims concerning
similarly named applications will shed light on what new technological ter-
minology or names companies may create to avoid such trademark litigation.
72. See Apple, 2011 WL 2638191 at *2.
73. See id. at *7-8, 11-12.
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